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I. Introduction
“[T]he Internet [contains] ‘the largest information database’ in the world. You
may find it hard to imagine, the vast resources we have made available to you, to dig up
information on anybody . . . in a 100% legal and efficient way . . . . You will be surprised
as to the information available on anybody including yourself.”
--advertisement from socialsecurity-numbersearch.com1
Welcome to the $5 billion-a-year personal data industry,2 a legal wild-west
frontier where legitimate and illegitimate players collect, aggregate, and exchange large
amounts of personal data without regulation.3 For example, anyone can click on the
internet ad referenced above and buy a person’s information including social security
number for only $34.95.4 In recent years, our increased reliance on electronic
transactions5 has led to an abundance of digitized personal data,6 greatly fueling the
industry’s growth. These transaction histories are often aggregated with other private and
public sector data to create behavioral profiles, primarily for marketing.7

1

Social Security Lookup, http://www.socialsecurity-numbersearch.com/social-security-numberlookup.htm (last visited February 14, 2006).
2
Heather Timmons, Security Breach at LexisNexis Now Appears Larger, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2005, at C7.
3
Jonathan Krim, Pentagon Creating Student Database, WASH. POST., June 23, 20005, at A1.
4
Social Security Lookup, http://www.socialsecurity-numbersearch.com/social-security-numberlookup.htm (last visited February 14, 2006).
5
A Pew research in 2004 found that 83 million people had shopped online, and overall online sale was
estimated to be $120 billion in 2004. Bob Tedeschi, No Longer a Niche Marketing Outlet, The Internet Is
Now Attracting Shoppers from Almost All Walks of Life, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2004, at C4.
6
See DANIEL SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 22-26 (2004) (DoubleClick, a company that profiles people
online browsing and shopping habits, has already amassed profiles for 80 million U.S. household at the end
of 1999).
7
See id. at 16-20.

1

In 2005, in the midst of increased identity thefts and data security breaches,
Congress began to tackle the lack of oversight in the data industry,8 and proposed twentytwo bills addressing identify theft.9 Because there is no comprehensive federal legal
framework to address data privacy,10 these proposed bills aim shore up holes in a
patchwork of federal laws that each addresses a narrow area of data privacy.11 For
example, some federal laws regulate the collection and use of records by federal
agencies,12 while others regulate access to education records,13 the sale of state
Departments of Motor Vehicles data,14 and privacy in credit reporting.15
While it is unclear what privacy legislation Congress will eventually pass, any
new legislation that restricts the transfer of data will likely face challenges on First
Amendment grounds. In recent years, companies that collect and sell personal data, as
well as corporations that use and share their own customers’ data, have fought regulation
as a restriction on free speech.16 Courts have just begun to address this First Amendment
defense, and often classify the collection and exchange of personal data as commercial
speech.17 Thus, how the courts apply the commercial speech doctrine to the use and sale
of personal data will directly impact whether the government may regulate in this area.
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This article will outline this emerging area of the commercial speech doctrine,
analyze the courts’ difficulties in applying the doctrine to data privacy laws, and propose
a new structural approach to determine the constitutionality of data privacy laws. Part II
of this article sets forth the background on privacy issues arising from the use of personal
data. Part III outlines two main problems with applying the commercial speech doctrine
to data privacy laws. In particular, it discusses the problem of categorizing personal data
as commercial speech and the problem of determining the proper level of scrutiny to
evaluate the constitutionality of data privacy regulations. In light of these problems, Part
IV proposes a new multi-tiered approach to the commercial speech doctrine for personal
data speech. The proposed approach eliminates the difficult inquiry of whether personal
data is commercial speech. Instead, under the proposed approach, categorical bans of
personal data speech will receive strict scrutiny while privacy regulations that aim to
address the issue of data control will receive intermediate scrutiny. The proposed
approach also includes a separate tier for data privacy legislation that provides for private
rights of action.
II. Background
A. Personal Data: The Beginning of a New Portable Commodity
In the 1970s, both corporations and government entities began using computer
databases to store records19 and made data portable for the first time.20 The transition
from paper to electronic records made it feasible for private parties to obtain data,
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analyze it, and sell it as a commodity. Indeed, government databases were the seed
data sources for many private commercial databases.21
In the last decade, unprecedented increases in both supply and demand for data
triggered an explosive growth of the personal data industry. On the supply side,
increased internet use led to an explosive growth in the amount of available data.22 For
example, one data profiler claims they have information on 90 million U.S. households.23
On the demand side, corporations began utilizing the new data commodity to target
advertisements to selected customers who would be interested in their products and
reaped improved returns on their advertising investments.24 The promise of better returns
led to a huge appetite for consumer data, which in turn fed the growth of the “data
mining” or “data profiling” industry, a group of companies that “aggregate information
contained in private databases to create consumer profiles that are then offered for sale to
interested parties.”25
Such profiles often include personal information ranging from information in
public records (e.g. name, social security number, race, gender, and home ownership) to
habitual information (e.g. shopping habits and utility usage) to private and potentially
embarrassing information (e.g. arrest records, lifestyle preferences, hobbies, religion, and
medical information).26 Such information is available for as little as $65 per thousand
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names, categorized by the type of consumer sought by marketers.27 For example, the
profiling company Focus USA boasts on its web site that it has profiling information on
“virtually every household in the country.”28 Their product offerings include such
creatively named lists such as “In Style Women,” “Born to Shop,” and “Gardening
Buffs.”29
B. “The heart of a surveillance system that will turn society into a transparent world.”
Even as far back as 1974, Supreme Court Justice William Douglas, quoting
Arthur Miller, noted that the computer has become “the heart of a surveillance system
that will turn society into a transparent world.”30 In Douglas’ time, George Orwell’s
novel 1984 depicted a future where “Big Brother” uses computer databases to track every
member of society.31 Three decades later, due to the availability of personal data, the
fictional and prophetic fears of surveillance, control, and loss of anonymity have become
alarmingly real.
For example, a recent GAO survey indicated 52 federal agencies had or planned
on having data-mining programs in 2004.32 Both the FBI and the Department of Defense
have used commercial databases for terrorist surveillance post 9/11.33 The military has
also tried to contract a marketing firm to create a customized database of teenagers to
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bolster sagging recruitment efforts.34 Besides the concerns of potential improper uses
by the government, there is also concern that such commercial databases can be used to
process sensitive information and cause potentially embarrassing or highly personal
information to float freely from database to database.36 For example, public arrest
records that are legitimately collected may be passed from one database to another and
end up illegitimately denying one’s employment or housing.
The dearth of meaningful legal requirements that such personal data be kept
securely37 means it can fall into wrong hands that can exploit it for illegal and harmful
purposes. For example, consumer profiles can facilitate crimes such as identity theft,
stalking, or harassment.38 To make matters worse, “uber-databases” can be created,
composed of non-sensitive information in such enormous quantities that they contain
detailed dossiers of each individual’s entire existence.39 While there may be legitimate
uses to these personal dossiers, their existence makes governmental and other illegitimate
uses more likely and damaging.
Despite these problems, there is currently no federal legislation that regulates the
sale of personal data or aggregated profiles. Instead, federal laws cover specific types of
personal data in specific contexts.40 Some notable legislation include older privacy laws
such as Privacy Act of 1974 and the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970. Both have data
privacy provisions applicable to the present problem.41 In recent years, for example,
Congress has enacted the Gramm-Leach-Bailey (GLB) Act of 1999 to mandate opt-out
34
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mechanism when corporations share “nonpublic personal information.”42 Congress
also enacted the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) of 2003 to
strengthen the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s privacy provisions.43
However, viewed in the expansive space where data can be collected and
exchanged, these federal laws cover only a small geography of the personal data
problem.44 Furthermore, these laws address privacy in certain contexts but ignore it in
others.45 Thus, critics have described the federal government’s response to privacy issues
as haphazard, mosaic and unsatisfactory.46
III. The First Amendment Defense and the Commercial Speech Doctrine
Even with their limited coverage, federal data privacy laws have been the subjects
of free speech litigation when they have been enforced.47 In particular, companies argue
that the First Amendment48 protects the free collection, use and exchange of personal
data. In the late 1990s, both the Ninth and the Tenth Circuits examined this First
Amendment defense for the first time and held that the commercial speech doctrine
governs the use and sale of personal data.49 However, applying the doctrine in its current
form to the area of personal data has proven to be problematic. First, owing to varying
definitions in the precedents, courts have difficulties categorizing personal data as
“speech” and “commercial speech.” Second, the uneven application of the commercial
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speech doctrine and intermediate scrutiny has produced inconsistent results in this area
of personal data speech. This section will discuss each of these problems in turn.
A. Is Personal Data Commercial Speech?
Since not all “speech” receives the same treatment under the First Amendment,
categorization is an integral part of any First Amendment inquiry.50 Unfortunately, both
the terms “commercial” and “speech”51 are loaded with multiple meanings and ill-defined
implications. In adjudicating data privacy litigation courts will need to first determine
whether personal data is “speech” in order to decide whether the First Amendment is
applicable. If so, courts will need to decide whether such speech is “commercial” to
apply the appropriate level of protection. As discussed below, each step of the analysis is
wrought with difficulties and uncertainties.
1. Data as “Speech”
At its core, First Amendment “speech” covers expressions in verbal, written or
artistic forms.52 In addition, the Court has held that “speech” include many actions such
as political contributions and wearing of communicative clothing.53 Given the Court’s
expansive definition of “speech,” numerous data privacy scholars have conceded that
First Amendment “speech” covers personal data,54 and the early circuit cases involving
data privacy have so held.55 For example, the Tenth Circuit in U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC56
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held that because the FCC prohibited phone companies (the speakers) from freely using
and sharing their customers’ personal data and phone records with other parties (the
audience), it was restricting speech.57
However, the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning does not go far enough to complete the
inquiry. This is because the First Amendment exempts certain “speech” such as
obscenities, as well as certain special areas such as those governed by securities law and
attorney-client privilege laws.58 These laws often restrict the use of acquired information
for purposes other than the original permissible one.59 By analogy, one may argue that
FCC in the U.S. West can restrict phone companies from collecting customers’ phone
usage and personal data for one purpose (maintaining their phone services) and use them
later for different purposes (e.g. for marketing purposes). The Tenth Circuit’s analysis
does not indicate whether any such exemption applies.
On the other hand, some have proposed that personal data be characterized as an
article of commerce.60 This characterization has some support in Reno v. Condon,61 a
Supreme Court case involving Congress’ exercise of its Commerce Clause power to
restrict sale of drivers’ personal data by state Departments of Motor Vehicles. The Court
there characterized such personal data as “articles of commerce.”62 This type of
characterization undoubtedly influences the courts toward categorizing personal data as
commercial speech.
2. Personal Data as “Commercial” Speech
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Courts also have difficulties justifying the categorization of personal data as
commercial speech because of the Court’s own murky definition of commercial speech.
This problem can be traced to the origin of the commercial speech doctrine, which arose
from cases involving commercial advertising. In 1975, in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,63 the Court first held that
commercial speech was within the scope of First Amendment protection. There, the
Court struck down a Virginia professional conduct statute that prohibited pharmacists
from advertising the price of prescription drugs.64 The Court reasoned that a
communication proposing a sale of a product X at the Y price is within the scope of First
Amendment protection65 because a free enterprise economy depended on numerous
private economic decisions, which in turn relied on the free flow of commercial
information.66 The formulation of proposing a sale of product X at the Y price came to
known as the “core notion” of commercial speech.67 Then in 1980, the Court in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission68 broadly defined
commercial speech as any “expression related solely to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience.”69
In one of the first personal data speech cases, the Ninth Circuit in United
Reporting Publishing Corp. v. California Highway Patrol70 held that the sale of names
and addresses of recently arrested individuals by a data publishing company constituted
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“commercial speech.”71 The court there acknowledged that “the precise bounds of the
category of expression that may be termed commercial speech” are subject to doubt.72
However, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the lack of precise bounds as the Supreme Court’s
giving broad discretion to the lower courts.73 The Ninth Circuit thus felt it had the
discretion to come to its own conclusion.74
The court reasoned that the data speech in question could be reduced to “I
[publishing service] will sell you [client] the X [names and addresses of arrestees] at the
Y price,” and so was a purely economic transaction.75 Therefore it would fit comfortably
within the narrow definition of commercial speech. However, this characterization is
incorrect because it erroneously classified the advertising of the data product as the
“speech” in question, when the “speech” subject of the regulation was really the arrestees
data. The court might have been confused because so much of the commercial speech
precedents involved advertising. Because of this error, the categorization of arrestee’s
personal data as commercial speech would only work under Central Hudson’s broader
definition of “related solely to the economic interests.” Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court later reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision on standing grounds and did not address
the commercial speech issue.76
A year after United Reporting, the Tenth Circuit decided the aforementioned U.S.
West77 case. Like the Ninth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit noted that while the use and sale of
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phone company customer data do not fit neatly into the traditional commercial speech
definition of “a speech that proposes a commercial transaction,”78 the traditional
definition does not comprise the “universe of commercial speech.”79 Furthermore, the
Tenth Circuit admitted there was much ambiguity in the doctrine as to what exactly
constituted commercial speech.80 Nonetheless the court assumed, without offering any
justification, that the personal data in question was commercial speech because it was
speech “integral to and inseparable from the ultimate commercial solicitation.”81
Due to ambiguity in the commercial speech precedents, it was impossible for the
Tenth Circuit to forward a good justification for classifying customer phone data as
commercial speech. The difficulty of precisely defining “commercial speech” is a
problem that predated United Reporting and U.S. West. In 1990, Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals Judge Alex Kozinski pointed out it was not unclear just what exactly met the
traditional narrow definition of “proposing a commercial transaction.”82 For example, a
TV ad could be classified as a very short film, which is a form of speech fully protected
by the First Amendment.83
Others have found the Central Hudson’s broader definition of “speech concerning
solely the economic interests of the speakers and audiences” problematic as well.84
Examples such as a newspaper article discussing business affairs and an author writing
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product reviews for pay would technically fall under this definition.85 However, such
speech receives no less protection than political, religious, and social commentary.86
Hence, it is argued that although personal data is being sold for the “economic interests,”
it still deserves full First Amendment protection.87 Justice Thomas also noted these
difficulties in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,88 a case involving regulation
on news racks on public sidewalks. He said: “[t]his very case illustrates the difficulty of
drawing bright lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct category.”89
Despite these difficulties, the Court does not seem ready to abandon the
commercial speech doctrine.90 In the last twenty-five years, the Court has not abandoned
the distinction between commercial speech and other types of speech, and only Justice
Thomas has indicated a willingness to abandon the distinction.91 Therefore, it is unlikely
that there will be any satisfying solution to the problem of categorizing personal data.
B. Development of Intermediate Scrutiny for Commercial Speech Regulation
Even if the Court were to construe personal data as commercial speech, there is
still the problem of applying the appropriate level of constitutional protection. The
commercial speech doctrine has undergone major changes in the last several decades, and
the shifting doctrine will affect any analysis of personal data as commercial speech cases.
This section will examine how the development of commercial speech doctrine has led to
difficulties for courts in data speech cases.
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Until the 1970s the Court afforded no constitutional protection to commercial
speech.92 In 1980, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission,93 the Court first applied intermediate scrutiny and used a four-part test to
determine the constitutionality of a commercial speech regulation.94 Now known as the
Central Hudson test, it provided that courts should determine: (1) whether the
commercial speech is truthful and not misleading, and if so, (2) whether the asserted
government interest is substantial, (3) whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and (4) whether the regulation is no more extensive than
is necessary to serve that interest.95
In 1996, in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,96 the Court opened the possibility
that strict scrutiny may be applied to commercial speech. In unanimously striking down
a Rhode Island ban on price advertising for alcohol, the Court said Central Hudson’s
intermediate scrutiny is only justified when the state regulates commercial messages to
protect consumers “from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sale practices.”97
Otherwise, “strict review” is appropriate.98 The Court proceeded to do so because it did
not find that the Rhode Island’s total ban of alcohol price information to be motivated by
a consumer protection interest that justified intermediary scrutiny.99 In particular, the
majority read the fourth prong of Central Hudson to require an evaluation of a ban’s
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effectiveness and an examination of alternatives to determine a ban’s
constitutionality.100 Under the majority’s application of the test, the regulation must be
“no more extensive than necessary.”101 Furthermore, the majority requires the regulation
to “directly advance” its purpose “to a material degree” or “significantly.”102
Justice O'Connor’s concurrence also appeared to tighten the requirement of the
last prong of the Central Hudson test by taking “the availability of less burdensome
alternatives” as a signal that narrow tailoring is not met.103 Furthermore, O’Connor states
that there was no need for the majority to apply a more strict version of the Central
Hudson test, since the Rhode Island’s regulation would have failed Central Hudson “as
is.”104 In sum, 44 Liquormart signaled the Court’s intention to increase protection for
commercial speech. Hence, post-44 Liquormart, a government regulation must meet this
searching examination. Therefore, it seems unlikely that a regulation banning
commercial speech would ever survive the Central Hudson test as applied by the 44
Liquormart court.105 It is not surprising that, since 44 Liquormart, the Court has struck
down regulations banning casino advertising106 and billboards for tobacco products.107
1. Intermediate Scrutiny Applied: U.S West
Post 44 Liquormart, the Tenth Circuit applied the Central Hudson test in the
aforementioned U.S. West case. There, the FCC issued an order108 requiring
telecommunication companies to implement an opt-in procedure before using, disclosing
100
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or sharing a customer’s personal information109 for marketing purposes.110 The “optin” procedure required a company to obtain customer consent prior to using or sharing
the customer’s information. To the phone companies, this was more restrictive than the
opposite “opt-out” procedure, which instead allowed a company to use or share
information until a customer decided to voice disapproval. The FCC order, however, did
not prohibit companies from contacting their own customers about the services to which
they already subscribed.111
In U.S. West, the first prong of Central Hudson was met because both parties
agreed that the data involved truthful and non-misleading information.112 The Tenth
Circuit then devoted substantial discussion on whether a government asserted privacy
interest could sufficiently meet the second prong of Central Hudson, which required
substantial state interest. While the court acknowledged that privacy may rise to the level
of substantial interest, the court looked for, but did not find, a showing of specific harms
such as potential for embarrassment or misappropriation of sensitive information.113
Nevertheless, the court assumed that the FCC had met the second prong,114 because it
would fail on the last two prongs.
On the third prong, the court, invoking 44 Liquormart languages, held that the
FCC failed to prove that the regulation “directly and materially advances its interest.”115
The court said that the FCC only relied on speculation and did not provide evidence that
109
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privacy interests would be harmed.116 Finally, the court held that the regulation did not
meet the fourth prong of Central Hudson, which required the regulation to be narrowly
tailored. Citing O’Connor’s occurrence in 44 Liquormart, the court noted that “evidence
of an obvious and substantially less restrictive means” indicated “a lack of narrow
tailoring.”117 The court reasoned that the opt-out approach advocated by the phone
companies was less restrictive than the FCC’s mandated opt-in approach, 118 citing
experimental data presented by the phone companies that only a small percentage of
customers granted approval to share their data when contacted under the opt-in
approach.119 The court rejected FCC’s position that opt-out was not as effective as opt-in
as an argument based only on “common sense” and speculation, which was sufficient
only to meet a rational basis analysis.120 Hence, the FCC lost under the last two prongs
of Central Hudson and the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari.121 Undoubtedly, the
44 Liquormart decision made the case much more difficult for the FCC.
2. A Novel Approach to Intermediate Scrutiny: Trans Union Corp. v. FTC122
Two years later after U.S. West was decided, the D.C. Circuit offered a different
and conflicting rationale for intermediate scrutiny in Trans Union Corp. v. FTC.123 The
court there upheld a FTC order preventing Trans Union, a credit reporting agency, from
selling its target marketing products. The data products consisted of lists of names and
addresses of individuals who met specific financial criteria, such as possession of an auto
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loan, a department store credit card, or two or more mortgages.124 The FTC acted
under the authority of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA),125 which restricts a credit
reporting agency to furnish consumer reports to persons for certain “permissible
purposes” only, some of which include determining eligibility for credit and
employment.126 The FTC determined that the lists that Trans Union sold to target
marketers were “credit reports” furnished for an impermissible purpose.127
Unlike the Tenth Circuit, the D.C. Circuit addressed the First Amendment
argument last in its opinion, devoting only five paragraphs to it.128 Also, instead of
applying Central Hudson, the D.C. Circuit justified intermediate scrutiny using a
rationale from Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.129 In Dun &
Bradstreet, the Court held that a plaintiff did not have to meet the New York Times actual
malice standard130 when he brought a defamation suit against a consumer reporting
agency who caused harm by issuing erroneous information about the plaintiff to five
customers.131
The D.C. Circuit reasoned that Dun & Bradstreet stood for the proposition that
speech that served only private interests deserved reduced constitutional protection.132
Since Trans Union’s lists were “solely of interest to the company and its business
customers and relates to no matter of public concern,”133 the lists warranted reduced
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constitutional protection.134 Without mentioning Central Hudson,135 the D.C. Circuit
simply held in two paragraphs that the government had met intermediate scrutiny.136
In its denial for rehearing,137 the D.C. Circuit defended its decision to apply Dun
& Bradstreet.138 The court admitted that Trans Union’s reports did not contain “wholly
false” information as with those in Dun & Bradstreet, but still dismissed the distinction
as non-critical.139 Interestingly, the D.C. Circuit discussed a line of cases decided under
the Central Hudson test. The court said that the FTC satisfied narrow tailoring required
by intermediate scrutiny because its action was distinguishable from those actions held to
be impermissible under various applications of Central Hudson. The D.C. Circuit
reasoned that, unlike restrictions on vice advertising (e.g. gambling, alcohol, tobacco),
where the government sought to mitigate harms caused by the advertised conduct or
product, the government here could not “promote its interest (protection of personal
financial data) except by regulating speech because the speech itself cause[d] the very
harm the government [sought] to prevent.”140 Hence the court implied that the results
would have been the same even if Central Hudson, as interpreted by 44 Liquormart, had
been applied, and that it was immaterial that the court arrived at intermediate scrutiny
from a different rationale. As such, the D.C. Circuit produced an outcome that is directly
opposite to that of the Tenth Circuit.
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After the denial for rehearing, Trans Union appealed to the Supreme Court,
which denied the petition for writ of certiorari,141 with Justices Kennedy and O’Connor
dissenting. Kennedy hinted that the D.C. Circuit’s rationale was out of the ordinary, and
perhaps incorrect: “[t]his case is of national importance, and the Court of Appeals has
adopted a novel approach to commercial speech. I would grant the petition for
certiorari.”142 Kennedy also correctly distinguished Dun & Bradstreet as a case
involving false speech and noted that that it was only a plurality opinion. This was a
controversial case that had been criticized, and transplanting its rationale to a truthful
speech context is problematic.143 In 2003, the Supreme Court declined an opportunity to
clear the confusion when it denied cert in the commercial speech case Nike v. Kasky.144
IV. Toward a Tiered Approach in Adjudicating First Amendment Challenges to
Data Privacy Laws
In light of the problems with these early commercial speech cases involving
personal data, this article proposes a tiered approach unique to data privacy laws. The
proposed approach moves the focus away from the debate over whether personal data is
“commercial” speech and instead focuses on ensuring effective data privacy laws are
made consistent with the speech protection goals of the First Amendment.
There are three reasons why the focus on the debate over whether data is
“commercial” speech is misplaced. First, while personal data are sold for commercial
purposes, there are instances when they are used for non-commercial purposes such as
charity fund-raising, political organizing, and private or police detective work. Hence,
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personal data cannot fit into an either-or distinction between commercial speech and
non-commercial speech; it is simply in a different category of its own. Second, US West
and United Reporting showed that that courts struggled to categorize personal data as
commercial speech. In addition it is clear that the Court is not moving toward a clear,
bright-line rule approach in commercial speech.145 It is enough to note that in many
instances personal data is analogous to commercial speech, and this can be a basis for
supporting intermediate scrutiny for some data privacy regulations. Third and most
important, the commercial attribute of personal data is secondary to the primary concern
of control. Unlike restriction on political speech or dangerous speech, regulation of
personal data is not about suppressing ideas, as personal data is neutral and contains no
opinion or idea. The main issue is the control of data -- who gets to use it and how. It is
more useful to emphasize the aspect of personal data as property or goods. Based on
these concepts of data control and data as property, this article proposes a three-tier
approach to evaluating the constitutionality of data privacy laws under the commercial
speech precedents. This tiered approach is somewhat similar to the Court’s Time, Place
and Manner jurisprudence, which varies the level of constitutional protection based on
the regulation scheme in question.
A. Top Tier: Strict Scrutiny for Categorical Bans
At the top tier, regulation that bans use or sale of personal data in a categorical
way should receive something akin to strict scrutiny in line with the approach taken by
the Court in 44 Liquormart. Just as it is difficult to justify a total ban on alcohol price
information to serve a public health purpose, government should not be able to ban any
data speech, commercial or otherwise, for privacy purposes unless it meets strict scrutiny.
145
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Justices Stevens and Kennedy’s dissent in United Reporting pointed out that were
United Reporting to lawfully obtain arrestees’ data from a legal source other than the
state government, California could not have banned United Reporting from using the data
for commercial purposes.146 Even though bans by category may be the most effective
means of privacy regulation, they completely wrestle away control of data from its owner
and heighten the risk of laws running contrary to the principle of free speech.
B. Second Tier: Intermediate Scrutiny for Regulation Requiring Consent
The second tier of the proposed approach distinguishes regulations that ban
speech from those that burden speech. When the government is burdening the exchange
of personal data to address the data control issue, intermediate scrutiny should apply.
Regulation requiring an opt-in falls within this category. Indeed, this approach should be
favored because it puts in place a default position in the law that addresses an imbalance
of bargaining power between corporations and individuals. The opt-in requirement is
similar to default contractual provisions that provide that there should be no free use of
data unless the parties have a “meeting of the minds.” For example, users of free email
websites often give up personal information to companies and allow them to share the
information, all in exchange for email services. This exchange is an “opt-in” in action
and fits with the data as property paradigm because personal data is given in exchange for
a benefit.
Requiring opt-in fits with the control paradigm since it requires individuals to
decide when and where to relinquish control of their personal information. Practically
speaking, companies that already have data would be required to obtain consent before
using and selling it. This would go a long way in addressing the privacy problems noted
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in Part II. No longer will websites indiscriminately sell data without first getting
consent. In addition, if intermediate scrutiny is met, laws should be able to require a
default of limited scope consent, so that data are not passed from place from place
without explicit consent.
It is true that the “opt-in” default position economically burdens companies, as do
regulations that require companies to securely store data. However, regulations that
burden data speech are beneficial because they correct the current devaluing of personal
data. Opt-in makes “post-consent” personal data valuable again and deters it from being
passed carelessly from one place to another. Regulation requiring secure storage also
will achieve the same effect. If personal data becomes expensive, companies will make
more effort to guard it.
Viewed in this way, the U.S. West decision was too harsh in striking down the
FCC order. The Tenth Circuit took notice of O’Connor’s 44 Liquormart concurrence,
which stated that, even under Central Hudson, the availability of a less restrictive
alternative is evidence that a law fails narrow tailoring.147 The Tenth Circuit gave only
this justification: the existence of opt-out was an indication that opt-in was not a least
restrictive means,148 which meant that the Tenth Circuit was essentially applying a least
restrictive means analysis. Yet the Tenth Circuit failed to take into account that both optin and opt-out are distinguishable from the type of total ban that triggered strict scrutiny
in 44 Liquormart. This distinction is taken into account in the tiered approach.
Another argument for less than strict scrutiny in this area is that 44 Liquormart
justified striking down bans on advertisement by reasoning that narrow tailoring requires

147
148

U.S. West v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1238-39 (10th Cir. 1999).
Id.

23

the government to pursue its interests by directly regulating the harmful conduct or
product promoted by the advertisement.149 On this point, the D.C. Circuit was correct in
Trans Union. It follows that, if personal data sold in aggregated form without consent is
the “actual” harmful product, then government regulation on the data “product” is exactly
the action that the Court requires. Indeed, language in 44 Liquormart seems to allow
more leeway when government acts in a consumer protection interest.150
Finally, data privacy is an inherently architectural problem that requires an
architectural solution.151 For example, the national Do-Not-Call registry, upheld by the
Tenth Circuit in 2004,152 provided the type of architectural solution that ordinary
customers needed to protect their privacy. There, the FCC and FTC provided a tool to
help consumers opt-out of telemarketing lists in one national centralized database. The
Tenth Circuit, characterizing the Do-Not-Call list as an “opt-in program” that put the
choice of whether or not to restrict commercial calls entirely in the hands of the
individuals, upheld the regulation.153 The Do-Not-Call registry example suggests that
there is a way in which the government can create a technological solution that allows
individual consumers to opt-out/opt-in more easily. This will help the many consumers
who are either unaware of privacy concerns or do not have enough savvy to protect their
privacy, again putting control of data back where it belongs.154
C. The Special Tier: “Data Defamation” Torts
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Finally, at the third tier is a different type of test altogether, one that would
follow the Court’s treatment of defamation torts under the First Amendment. Covered in
this tier are statutes that have private rights of action provisions against companies that
violate privacy laws. Much like the way that defamation actions are treated differently
under the First Amendment, these provisions should also receive a special formulation of
scrutiny, since they are analogous to torts laws. Part of the Trans Union opinion
undoubtedly took this factor into consideration because the FRCA provided for private
right of action against Trans Union for violating the FRCA.155
This is an evolving area of law, because unlike defamation, privacy harms often
involve truthful speech. The law is not ready to abandon this historical distinction of true
versus false speech, even though with regard to privacy true speech often causes more
damages. For example, fake or incorrect social security numbers and personal
information are of no use to identity thieves, or telemarketers. This is another area where
personal data’s unique attributes make it a misfit under the traditional notions of the First
Amendment.
Moreover, individuals often suffer privacy harm inherent in the aggregation of
truthful personal information. This area remains unsettled because of rapid technological
changes as well as shifting policy debates.156 The technological possibility for pervasive
harms from truthful data remains not yet fully recognized by the public in the present. If
and when the harm caused by truthful personal data is recognized as equal to those of
false speech that gives rise to traditional torts actions, Congress or state legislative bodies
should be able to codify such harms into statutes. The First Amendment should have a
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place for such “data torts” along side of defamation torts. Indeed, if one accepts this
argument, then the D.C. Circuit’s analogy between the harm in the truthful credit report
and that of defamation does not seem so far-fetched.
Conceptually, consumer statutes that allow for private rights of action also helps
solve the architectural problem of unequal balancing power in a way similar to the DoNot-Call registry. These consumer protection statutes provide individuals with tools to
take back some control of their own data through litigation. Indeed, individuals are
already starting to file suits under state consumer protection laws to protect their data
privacy. The first example is Leadbetter v. Comcast Cable Communications,157 a class
action suit where cable internet users are suing cable providers over the release of their
information for investigation into illegal music downloading. In another case, an
America Online (AOL) subscriber sued AOL for giving away his information in response
to a simple police request.158 The First Amendment should not unduly restrict these
consumers from pursuing their private rights of action to protect data privacy.
V. Conclusion
Privacy regulations over the use and sale of personal data face constitutional
uncertainty. As the commercial speech doctrine continues to govern this area, the
Court’s vague formulation of what triggers intermediate scrutiny versus strict scrutiny
leaves both opportunities and challenges for regulatory agencies like the FTC and the
FCC. The focus on whether personal data constitutes commercial speech is misplaced,
and a new category for personal data is needed to allow the courts to better account for
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the distinctive attributes of personal data. Finally, such a new category of data speech
can adapt from precedents from the commercial speech area, and the Court should
distinguish total bans from other regulatory regimes to accomplish the goals of
encouraging effective privacy laws while protecting speech rights. In this manner, the
Court will ensure that the commercial speech doctrine as applied to personal data will
accord proper weight to the increasingly important interests of data privacy.
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